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1. The European Neighbourhood Policy – what does it consist of? 
 
If a stranger were asked to choose the most ambitious of the current EU policies, he might 
pick the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Not only does it bring forty-three countries 
together, EU members and non-members alike, but its main aims are so broad, and at times  
so contradictory, that one wonders how all of them could be reached: The Policy purportedly 
should provide stabilisation and democratisation; it should secure inclusion but avoid further 
enlargement; it should ensure differentiation, yet create “one ring of friends”. All this makes the 
ENP similar to a strange animal whose future evolution is shrouded from the observations of even 
the most penetrating analysts.  
 
However, even in its current rather underdeveloped form the ENP can be subjected  
to scrutiny, thus yielding some interesting findings about its nature and its strengths and 
weaknesses all of which will undoubtedly define its future course. In this respect, the three defining 
features of the ENP, mentioned tentatively above, deserve more attention. Surprisingly perhaps, all 
three of them can be cast as pairs of dual opposites that compete for supremacy in the policy: 
enlargement vs. non-enlargement, differentiation vs. unification, and finally stabilisation  
vs. democratisation.  
 
The first tension, between enlargement and non-enlargement, is undoubtedly a major 
problem underlying the entire policy. In fact, for a number of EU member states the policy’s main 
aim is to provide outsiders with a viable alternative to full-fledged membership. Such an incentive 
remained unchallenged during the first years of the policy’s existence. However, after the 2004 and 
2007 enlargement rounds, the balance changed dramatically. Virtually all post-communist EU 
members went from being outsiders to the most adamant supporters of further enlargement 
overnight. In Poland, for instance, the Ukrainian membership, or – as it is fashionably labelled – the 
“European perspective” has become one of the priorities of foreign policy. But all other countries 
also have their shoo-ins, be it Moldavia for Romania, or the countries of the Western Balkans for 
the Czech Republic. The European Commission has also managed, rather skilfully, to avoid 
explicit statements supporting one interpretation or the other. The price to pay for this diplomatic 
stance, however, is the policy’s ambiguity – a problem that will grow less and less acceptable for 
all those involved.  
 
The second tension, between unification and differentiation, is reflected in the conviction  
of the policy authors to create one ring of EU friends, spanning from Morocco to Ukraine and 
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Russia. From the beginning the idea was seriously hampered because some countries fell out – for 
Russia, a special strategic partnership was clearly the preferred option; other countries like Libya, 
Syria, and Belarus are (albeit for different reasons) also de facto excluded from the policy. 
However, the biggest problem with the one-policy-fits-all approach is the almost insurmountable 
difference between the Eastern and Southern ENP partners. To start with, there is no doubt that 
Eastern partners are European, unlike the South. Also, most countries in the East have clearly 
spelled out their wish to become EU members, whereas the South does not have such ambitions. 
And while the Mediterranean Sea can be easily interpreted as a natural border to delineate where 
the EU expansion should stop, there is not such a border in the East. As a result, it will prove 
increasingly more difficult to explain, for instance, why Romania should be in and Moldova out.  
 
Finally, stability is considered one of the three main focal points of the policy.1 Yet stability, 
together with the notion of shared ownership, is often at odds with deep cutting political reforms 
and related efforts at democratisation in the neighbouring countries. Of course, it is quite 
understandable why the retreat from political conditionality is so fashionable today: Many believe 
that in the Southern partner countries, particularly where the incentive for reform is low, the 
previous approach proved rather counterproductive. However, at the same time it deprives the EU 
of a main instrument that could be used vis-à-vis countries like Belarus, i.e. linking EU aid  
to political reforms. 
 
 Having all these tensions in mind, this working paper focuses on the role of the new 
member states and particularly on the Czech Republic’s (potential) contribution to the ENP. We 
start by discussing the origins and early evolution of the ENP, which we believe is necessary for 
understanding these countries’ role in it. The next section is dedicated to the role played by the 
new member states, and especially the Visegrád Group. The following part analyses the strengths 
and deficiencies of the Czech Eastern Policy; and the final section lists some recommendations 
aiming at improving the quality of the Czech Eastern Policy in the framework of the ENP.  
 
 
 
2. From the enlargement to “a ring of friends” 
 
The ENP was born out of the framework of the European Union’s Eastern enlargement. 
Thus it is not surprising that the enlargement served as a strong justification for the policy launch. 
When the official accession negotiations started in 1998, various political initiatives regarding 
Eastern Europe, which primarily came from the UK, Sweden, Poland and Germany, started to be 
drawn (a “proximity policy” and more generally the “Wider Europe” initiative).2 These initiatives 
were addressed to the Eastern neighbours of the EU and they aimed to create a sub-regional 
policy analogical to the Northern Dimension or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  
 
But countries like France, Spain and Italy began to complain that too much attention and 
resources had already been given to the EU’s Eastern neighbours and argued that the re-
launching of the Barcelona process should take first priority. They also feared that the term “Wider 
Europe” could be confused with an accession perspective. To solve this stalemate, the Council of 
General Affairs asked the Commissioner, Chris Patten, and the Special Representative for the 
CFSP, Javier Solana, to prepare a common strategy for a cross-pillar policy. It resulted 
 in a common letter where Patten and Solana differentiated between the various potential regions 
concerned by the strategy.3  Later, after including the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and the countries of the Southern Caucasus, the “Wider Europe” initiative became the 
                                                 
1 European Commission (2003a), Wider Europe-Neighbourhood : a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, communication to the Council and the Parliament, 11/03/2003, COM (2003) 104 final; Prodi, R. (2002), “A Wider Europe.  
A Proximity policy as the key to Stability”, speech/02/619, Brussels, Dec. 2003. 
2 Common letter of Chris Patten/Anna Lindh of 2001, Jack Straw’s Letter to the Spanish presidency, speeches from Polish ex-Foreign 
Minister, Cimoszewicz, Polish strategies on Wider Europe, and German-Polish strategies on ENP.  
3 Patten, C., Solana, J., (2002), Wider Europe. Available on: <Hhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdfH> 
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“European Neighbourhood Policy”. To underline the policy’s importance, Javier Solana also 
included it in the European Security Strategy of 2003.4  
 
But the Commission set the main policy design, which aimed to create a cross-pillar policy. 
Since the strategy developed for the enlargement was considered a true success at that time,5  
it represented a fundamental source of inspiration for the launch of the “Wider Europe – New 
Neighbourhood” initiative.6 Therefore, the first documents to set the policy were strongly inspired 
by the experience of the enlargement.7 In the Commission’s propositions of 2003 and 2004, one 
clearly recognises similarities between the policy ideas and the philosophy of enlargement and 
those of the ENP (accession conditions/common values, partnership, differentiation, 
deconcentration, decentralisation, ownership, and participation). Various policy instruments of the 
last EU pre-accession strategy have also been adapted to the context of the neighbourhood policy: 
Programmes like cross-border-cooperation (CBC), Twinning, TAIEX and other programmes in the 
field of culture and education are now part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) that replaced the TACIS and MEDA programmes in 2007. 8 As the new member 
states have accumulated experience with the tools of enlargement, it is not surprising that they 
have tried to play a growing role in the launching of the ENP. 
 
 
 
3. How the new members co-shaped the ENP 
 
From the opening of accession negotiations in 1998 to the launching of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003-04, the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
– at that time still candidates – played a major role as they influenced certain aspects of the 
European agenda. In regard to the ENP, they did so with “older” member states like the United 
Kingdom, Sweden or Germany. 9 Indeed, they are still very active in promoting closer cooperation 
with the ENP countries in the East and thus most of them support the current German ENP Plus 
strategy.10 
 
Among the new member states, four categories of countries have emerged. First, Poland 
as a case sui generis has been the most vocal supporter of the Eastern dimension of the ENP. 
Polish proposals were showing Warsaw’s concerns for the absence of a systematic EU policy in 
Eastern Europe in general. 11 The Polish government issued a non-paper on the “Eastern 
Dimension” in 2003 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Cimoszewicz gave some remarkable 
speeches on the question. 12 Although the idea of an “Eastern Dimension” was not brought to the 
EU level, many elements of the Polish proposition have been incorporated into the ENP. The 
proposition asked for an Eastern Policy similar to that of the Northern Dimension or the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It argued that relations with the Eastern neighbours should be 
differentiated, so as to develop bilateral relations and a national strategy that would take into 
consideration the context of each country. However, Russia was not included in this proposition 
                                                 
4 Solana, J. (2003), European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003. 
5 European Commission (2003), Wider Europe-Neighbourhood : a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003. 
6 Interviews at DG Enlargement, April 2004, and DG Relex, February 2006. 
7 Ibid. 
8 More on this Tulmets, E. (2006), “Adapting the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy : The ENP as a Substitute to 
Enlargement?”, in: Kratochvíl, P. (ed.), The EU and its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems, Priorities, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů: 
Praha, pp. 16-34. 
9 Interviews at DG Relex (ENP coordination), European Commission, 23 February 2006; at the Finnish and Estonian Permanent 
Representations to the EU, Brussels, 5 and 7 June 2006.  
10 E.g. Duleba, A. (2007), “The EU’s Eastern Policy. Central European Contribution. In a Search for New Approach”, Policy Paper, (1), 
Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, January 2007.  
11 See Buras, P., Pomorska, K. (2006), “Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 6 (19), 27 July 
2006, pp. 34-43, Hwww.deutsche-aussenpolitik.deH; Natorski, M. (2007) “Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, European Political Economy Review, (7), Summer, Hwww.eper.orgH.  
12 E.g. Cimoszewicz, W. (2003), “The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View”, speech at the conference “The EU 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, Warsaw, 20 February 2003, Hwww.msz.gov.plH. 
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because contrary to the other Eastern countries “it does not aspire to membership”.13 The Polish 
proposal strongly relied on its experience from EU accession.  Therefore, to improve cross-border 
cooperation and to adapt the Twinning instrument to the neighbourhood, it suggested that all 
elements which have been taken over by the new ENP strategy. On a more political note, however, 
Poland has also worked with countries like Germany, to shape the EU’s agenda regarding the 
relation with Ukraine before and after the Orange revolution at the end of 2004.14 
 
Second, the Baltic states, mainly Lithuania and later on Estonia, were also involved in the 
defining of EU’s relations with its neighbours before the enlargement. Both Lithuanian and 
Estonian politicians insisted that it was necessary for the EU to support the processes  
of democratisation in Belarus and Ukraine, as well as in the Southern Caucasus, especially after 
the Rose Revolution in Georgia. 15 Recently, the three Baltic States proposed the strategy of “three 
plus three” to “express solidarity towards the former small Soviet republics” of the Southern 
Caucasus, whose relations with Russia are still quite ambiguous.16  
 
Third, the Visegrád Countries were also able to put some proposals on the table, but 
unfortunately their support for a unified approach has been of a wavering quality. As far as the 
Visegrád Countries are concerned, Slovakia is probably second only to Poland in the debates on 
the ENP, and it has also been supportive of an “Eastern Dimension” in the EU’s external relations. 
Since 2001, various conferences have been organised in Slovakia on the topic, and the 
government has also proposed some position papers on the subject.17 For Hungary, the protection 
of Hungarian minorities abroad, which was already a key priority during Hungary’s accession into 
the EU, now represents a motivation to get engaged in the ENP regarding the East. The 
Nyíregyháza Initiative, which started in October 2003 and is meant to enhance the cross-border 
cooperation with Ukraine, is considered “part of Hungary’s contribution to the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy”.18 The Initiative will promote intensive work contacts in the fields of education, 
environmental protection, student exchange programmes and the specified training of local 
municipality officials.  
 
Fourth, as of recently, Romania and Bulgaria have become important players too. The 
enlargement of the EU to both Romania and Bulgaria has created “a new challenge for the 
enlarged Union, namely the Black Sea dimension”.19 The Bulgarian government also supports the 
development of stronger cooperation with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, and the 
Romanian government indicated that it is in favour of the EU’s ENP Plus strategy.20  Romania also 
promotes closer cooperation with Moldova as a potential candidate for EU accession.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Cimoszewicz, W. (2004), “The Eastern Policy of the European Union”, speech at the Institute of Political and Social Sciences, Paris, 
Materials and Documents, 7/2004, July 2004, pp. 20-24. 
14 Auswärtiges Amt/Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für 
eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien (June 2001 – May 2003), Berlin/Warsaw, 2003. 
Hhttps://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/eu/dt-pl-studie.pdfH; Gromadzki, G. et al, (2005), More than 
Neighbour – Proposal for the EU’s Future towards Ukraine, Warsaw/Kyiv, Stefan Batory Foundation, International Renaissance 
Foundation. 
15 Paulauskas, A. (2004) “Lithuania´s new foreign policy”, Speech by the acting president of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius University, 
24 May 2004. Hhttp://paulauskas.president.lt/en/pne.phtml?id=4995H.   
16 Interview at the Estonian Permanent Representation to the EU, 7 June 2006, and at with the Deputy State Secretary at the Estonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 28 June 2006. 
17 For example Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, K., Duleba, A., Póti, L., Votápek, V. (eds.) (2003), Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union. 
Developing Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. A Visegrád Perspective. Thinking about an Eastern Dimension, Center for 
Eastern Studies, Warsaw / Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava. 
18 Zupkó, G. (2004), “Hungary’s contribution to the EU New Neighbourhood policy”, speech at the conference “New Europe 2020: 
Visions and Strategies for Wider Europe”, Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Turku, 27 August 2004. 
Hhttp://www.tukkk.fi/pei/NewEurope/Zupko.pdfH   
19 Raik, K., Gromadzki, G. (2006), “Between activeness and influence. The contribution of new member states to EU policies towards 
the Eastern neighbours”, Policy study commissioned by the Open Estonia Foundation, Tallinn, September 2006. Hhttp://www.upi-
fiia.fi/eng/institute/news/index.php?nid=33H  
20 Chifu, I. (2006), “The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. A Romanian Approach”, Eurojournal.org, October. 
Hhttp://eurojournal.org/H   
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4. Czech Eastern Policy  
 
 When speaking about the Czech position regarding the ENP, let it first be said that in the 
past, particularly in the 1990s, Eastern Europe was not a region in which the Czech Republic was 
particularly active. In the first years after the break-up of the Communist Bloc, Czechoslovak 
diplomacy took great pains to distance itself from the Eastern European space. It did so both 
rhetorically, with the “return to Europe” mantra of Czechoslovak foreign policy; and practically – by 
insisting on the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance. Simultaneously, Czechoslovakia negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from the country, which had been stationed there since 1968. After all these foreign policy aims 
were reached, Prague’s diplomats turned to the West and their eyes were fixed there for the 
remainder of the 1990’s.21  
 
Three issues were particularly conducive in strengthening this Western orientation: First, 
with the fall of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the country lost a common 
border with the territory and mutual contacts, including cultural, economic, and political, slumped. 
Second, Eastern Europe started to be depicted in Czech media and in the political discourse as 
poor, unstable and full of dangers, the only escape being Western integration organisations such 
as the European Union and NATO. This murky picture was first confirmed by the (failed) coup  
of 1991 and later through the bloody war in Chechnya, unleashed in 1994. Third and most 
importantly, Russia, the main representative of Eastern Europe, chose a very unwise strategy 
during its negotiations about the NATO enlargement. It did so by trying to surpass the candidate 
countries and by discussing the issue exclusively with the United States and other influential NATO 
members. The outcome was not only a sour period in Czech-Russian relations but also a shift from 
indifference to growing irritation and mistrust toward the East.22   
 
Hence, at the end of the decade, the Czech Republic secured most of its foreign policy 
aims (freeing itself from the remnants of the Soviet/Russian influence, entering NATO and 
preparing for EU membership), yet it did so at a price:  Not only did Czech diplomacy lose its 
traditional ties to the Eastern countries, its public also marked a substantial increase in antipathy 
toward the East.23 
 
A change in this rather unfavourable situation commenced only after 2000, when the course 
of Russian foreign policy took a pragmatic turn after Putin’s rise to power. This was accompanied 
by a renewed interest in Russia by Central Europe. It looked as though Russia was finally willing  
to put up with the NATO enlargement and discuss other bilateral issues which had not been 
tackled for the greater part of the 1990s (such as Russian financial obligations towards the Czech 
Republic). Moreover, with the approaching EU enlargement, a number of new issues began to crop 
up (visa regime, bilateral trade, etc.).  
 
The Czech Republic also felt compelled to react to the changing environment. 
Unfortunately, the Czech attitude to the East was still marred by three privative factors.  
 
1. First of all, for Czech politicians the “East” quite often was synonymous with Russia. Hence, 
even when Poland and Hungary were busy weaving an intricate net of relations with their 
neighbouring countries, particularly Ukraine, the Czech Republic still saw the developments in the 
East through a Russo-centric prism.  
 
                                                 
21 For more on this see Kratochvíl, P. et al. (2006), Foreign Policy, Rhetorical Action and the Idea of Otherness: the Czech Republic and 
Russia. In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 39, no. 4/2006, pp. 497-511.   
22 Cf. Votápek, V. (2004), Česká východní politika (Czech Eastern Policy). In: Pick, O., Handl, V. (eds.) (2004), Zahraniční politika 
České republiky 1993-2004: Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy (Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 1993-2004, Successes, Problems, 
and Perspectives). Institute of International Relations, Prague, pp. 99–109. 
23 See the press release of the CVVM Vztah k jiným národnostem II, SÚ AV, 22 January 2007,  
Hhttp://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100644s_ov70122.pdfH  
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2. The second factor was related to the country’s efforts to streamline all its policies in one aim – 
gaining a full-fledged EU membership as soon as possible. This meant that whenever two foreign 
policy options clashed, the one leading more directly to EU membership was almost invariably 
chosen. For instance, while Poland made clear that it did not support the introduction of a visa-
regime for Ukraine, the Czech Republic, striving for early entrance into the Schengen Area, 
withdrew from the visa-free regime in 2000 and thus, undertook this step almost four years before 
their entry into the EU.  
 
3. Third, Czech diplomacy has long seen the Balkans as its main priority area. Czech politicians  
of all stripes have continuously declared their support for Balkan countries such as Croatia, Serbia 
and Montenegro in their efforts to overcome the war legacy and to approach the European Union. 
Quite understandably, once the countries of the Western Balkans were marked as (potential future) 
candidates, the appeal of the ENP was further decreased.24  
 
Contrary to some of the newer EU member states, Czech involvement in shaping the ENP 
came about rather late. The real change in Czech foreign policy occurred only after its entry into 
the EU and specifically over the last two years. Since then, Czech diplomacy has started to actively 
shape the ENP, and by doing so it has reached three vitally important elements of its Eastern 
Policy – specialisation, geographical focus, and multilateral support. Indeed, this surge in activities, 
both generally in the ENP and specifically in the framework of the Visegrád Four, has come in high 
time: Once the Czech Republic assumes EU presidency in 2009, the Eastern dimension should 
become one of the proclaimed objectives of Prague diplomacy during its EU leadership period. 
 
Regarding specialisation, the clear focus of the Czech Eastern Policy is democratisation 
and related human rights issues. The Czech Foreign Ministry, an institution with a very clear notion 
of what the Czech Eastern Policy should look like, has created a special department to deal with 
such issues like the transition to democracy in 2004. The switch to a more specialised agenda was 
paralleled by a precise definition of the geographic scope of Czech policy. The Czech bilateral 
foreign aid to the Eastern ENP countries has grown considerably over the last years, compared  
to what the Southern neighbours of the EU receive (see Table 1).  The two main priority countries 
are Ukraine and Moldova, yet Belarus and Georgia are included as well and receive a large portion 
of the Czech aid policy for ENP countries. A number of measures corroborate this orientation: The 
Czech Republic often initiates EU debates on concrete steps regarding Belarus; it has also 
become an active player in the solution of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. In 2005 it became 
one of the few EU Member States to be diplomatically present in Chisinau.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 See Kratochvíl, P. & Braun, M. (2007), The Czech Republic (Country Report), EU-25/27 Watch, No. 4/2006, January, Hhttp://www.eu-
consent.net/library/EU25Watch/EU-25_27%20Watch%20No.%204.pdfH  
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Table 1: Czech assistance to the ENP countries and Russia (millions CZK, 1999-2005) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 1999-
2005 
Algeria - 0,0 3,5 0,7 3,7 0,4 4,7 13,0* 
Armenia 0,0 1,9 19,3 24,4 3,7 4,0 12,1 65,4 
Belarus 0,0 0,0 14,2 13,6 8,2 21,6 28,5 86,1 
Georgia 0,0 0,0 24,1 32,3 15,2 34,8 15,8 122,2 
Jordan 3,8 1,2 1,6 2,6 6,8 6,1 4,8 26,9 
Lebanon 0,0 1,9 2,6 2,7 5,1 5,4 1,6 19,3 
Moldova 0,3 0,0 35,2 44,6 45,7 28,0 16,2 170,0 
Morocco 0,0 1,9 2,7 4,9 2,5 2,6 6,0 20,6 
Palest. Adm. 
Areas 
29,0 33,2 0,0 7,3 16,4 6,0 5,4 97,3 
Russia 0,0 1,9 12,6 10,7 46,3 101,8 - 173,3** 
Ukraine 22,1 23,9 74,0 70,3 30,2 117,7 110,7 448,9 
Total 55,2*** 65,9 189,8 214,4 183,8 328,4 205,8**** 1243,0 
 
Source: Own compilation from: Podrobné statistiky zahraniční rozvojové spolupráce ČR za roky 1999-2004 a 2000-2005 – OECD, 
http://www.rozvojovestredisko.cz . 
* 2000-2005 only; ** 1999-2004 only; *** without Algeria; **** without Russia 
 
Notes: 
1) Total bilateral aid from the Czech Republic for 1999-2005: 7 509,85 Million CZK (share of ENP countries and Russia: 16,55%).  
2) Total aid from the Czech Republic for 1999-2005 (bilateral and multilateral): 12 051,31 Million CZK (share of ENP countries and 
Russia: 10,3%).  
3) The global foreign aid policy evolved from 0,032% in 1999 to 0,114% of the Czech GDP in 2005.  
 
 
In forging a more systematic approach with Eastern Europe, several Czech NGOs have 
played an indispensable role. Although the main concerns of organisations like The People 
 in Need (Člověk v tísni)25 are of humanitarian nature, they have also been instrumental in showing 
that the Eastern Policy must be rooted in people-to-people contacts and stronger presence on the 
ground. Hence, the political aspects of their activities cannot be overlooked. This claim was further 
substantiated when the former Director of the People in Need Foundation Tomáš Pojar became 
the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is responsible, among other matters, also for 
“transition assistance”.  
 
Perhaps the most important achievement has been the successful presentation of Czech 
proposals at the multilateral level in the EU. Czechs are active participants of the group of “like-
minded” countries (together with some older Member States and almost all new ones) who aim  
to increase the relevance of the ENP for the whole EU. The Czech Republic scored yet another 
success in its cooperation with the other members of the Visegrád Four when Prague proposed  
a non-paper about the EU’s Eastern Policy, which was accepted (in its modified form) by the other 
three members of the grouping. Although it is still not public, this non-paper could become the 
long-needed baseline on which the Czech contribution to the ENP will be systematically built in the 
future.  
 
A final confirmation of Eastern Europe’s growing relevance in Czech diplomacy has been  
its change of foreign policy priorities in recent years. While the neighbourhood policy was not listed 
as a priority of the Foreign Policy Conception of the Czech Republic in the Years 2003-2006,26 
recent statements from the highest echelons of the Foreign Ministry have consistently ranked the 
ENP, and Eastern Europe in general, among the top priorities.27 
 
The growing importance of the neighbour countries and Eastern Europe is also reflected by 
the increase of trade turnover between the Czech Republic and these countries. Although the 
                                                 
25 For more details on their activities related to human rights promotion and democratisation see People in Need, 
Hhttp://clovekvtisni.cz/index2en.php?sid=404H   
26 Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky na léta 2003-2006 (The Foreign Policy Conception of the Czech Republic in the Years 
2003-2006). Approved by the Government of the Czech Republic on 3 March 2003, www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=4191 
27 See for instance Vondra, A. (2006), Česká zahraniční politika: tři principy, trojí směřování a tři témata (Czech Foreign Policy: Three 
Principles, Three Directions, Three Topics). Mezinárodní politika, No. 11/2006, pp. 17-19. 
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increase is distributed rather unevenly among the individual countries, it is clear that growth  
in trade with the countries of the East is substantially higher than in the case of the South. For 
instance, the turnover with Russia increased by 45 percent and with Ukraine by 126 percent (see 
Table 2). Although a large part of the increase is due to the rising price of energy resources, there 
is no doubt that the Czech Republic is gradually returning to the Eastern markets. At the same 
time, however, we should bear in mind that even with this surge in trade relations, Czech trade with 
the ENP partner countries and Russia still constitutes as a mere fraction of the overall Czech trade 
exchange (see Graph 1). 
 
 
Table 2: The development of trade: Czech Republic - Russia and the ENP Countries 
(turnover for 2000-2005 in thousands CZK) 
 
      2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Growth 
in %
   Russia 95151395 94500917 76793494 82274512 95079761 138054438 45,08
Armenia 358276 194872 150104 126170 223965 N/A -37,49
Azerbaijan 681057 4718430 6179978 7333355 7831242 14906446 2088,72
Belarus 5067095 3320405 2847606 3263443 3713308 3493865 -31,05
Georgia 226607 217749 243588 414127 451611 N/A 99,29
Moldova 469750 627935 401114 450407 1122651 N/A 138,99
Ukraine 14732570 16815842 16347504 17123811 26385072 33347592 126,35
Eastern 
Dimension 
Σ (Russia + ENP 
Eastern Dimension) 
116686750 120396150 102963388 110985825 134807610 189802341 62,66
Algeria 4571081 2974696 1961183 2596682 3023723 N/A -33,85
Egypt 2410980 2443037 2017441 1713240 2221692 N/A -7,85
Jordan 241820 462182 556140 394252 560961 N/A 131,97
Israel 4512900 4784022 4323912 3761757 5414828 N/A 19,99
Lebanon 1389289 1277701 1019317 919477 970130 N/A -30,17
Libya 149505 3842621 936628 1686292 1966340 N/A 1215,23
Morocco 778950 884501 839659 906365 1419627 N/A 82,25
Palestinian Authority 0 36404 1991 2244 23010 N/A 23010,00
Syria 890311 2023838 4835711 4819215 2782662 N/A 212,55
Tunisia 579635 672900 975345 1204318 1184327 N/A 104,32
EN
P 
C
ou
nt
rie
s 
Southern 
Dimension 
Σ (ENP Southern 
Dimension) 
15524471 19401902 17467327 18003842 19567300 N/A 26,04
    Σ 132211221 139798052 12040715 128989667 154374910 N/A 16,76
 
Sources: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky (2003), Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 2002 
do prosince 2002. Praha; Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky (2005) Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období 
od ledna 2004 do prosince 2004. Praha; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic (2006) Report on the Foreign Policy of the 
Czech Republic between January 2005 and December 2005. Prague. 
 
Explanatory Notes: 
1) When the data in the sources differ, the most recent source was used. 
2) Belarus - the turnover in absolute numbers for 2005 was calculated by converting the amount available in USD into CZK, 
according to the ratings of CNB for May 7, 2007. 
3) The growth figures are sometimes incomplete as some data from 2005 are unavailable. 
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Graph 1 Share of Russia and the ENP countries in Czech overall trade turnover for 2004 
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 Yet, despite recent accomplishments, a number of obstacles persist. The Czech public 
remains disinterested, and news from Eastern Europe is scarce and almost always related  
to crime, human rights violations, poverty, and other negatively perceived topics. As a result, the 
ENP remains a highly technical question and decision-making “rests in the hands of the 
bureaucratic elite”.28 Moreover, even the expert debate is limited to just a few think-tanks 
(Association for International Affairs, Europeum Institute for European Policy, Prague Security 
Studies Institute, Institute of International Relations) and their activities are not always linked  
to issues discussed at a political level. A lack of coverage is also reflected in the political 
presentation of policies, which often end up with superficial statements about the need for stability 
in the European neighbourhood or, even worse, by confusing the ENP with other EU policies 
towards the Balkans, Turkey or Russia.  
 
 
 
5. What role can the Czech Republic play in the ENP?  
 
Support for the ENP Plus strategy  
 
Czech diplomats are fully aware that their position is different from their counterparts in the 
other V4 countries. This is because the Czech Republic does not share a common border with any 
of the partner countries, and so issues related to cross-border cooperation, illegal migration and 
many others are perceived as less important. On the other hand, some issues remain high on the 
Czech diplomatic agenda: For instance, migration policy has become one of the priorities of the 
Czech national strategy, as Ukrainians represent one of the biggest and most visible foreign 
communities in the Czech Republic.29 Similarly, human rights promotion has steadily been moved 
up in the pecking order of Czech foreign policy priorities. In other words, even though the Czech 
position is somewhat different from the other countries in the region, it still has strong interests 
                                                 
28 Interview with a Czech diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 7 February 2007. 
29 Ukrainians make up to one third of all foreigners working in the Czech Republic and their number is almost 90.000 persons. The 
official statistics, however, does not include illegal migration, which would certainly mean a further substantial increase. See Cizinci 
v ČR (Foreigners in the Czech Republic), Czech Statistical Office,  
Hhttp://www.czso.cz/ciz/cizinci.nsf/i/popis_aktualniho_vyvoje_pocet_cizincu_v_crH  
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vested in strengthening the ENP. This is also why the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially 
supports the German ENP Plus strategy. 
 
Yet while the country generally agrees with the German proposals, one element of the ENP 
Plus causes some concerns – the energy policy. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs hesitates 
here between the German and Polish positions: Warsaw is suspicious of German proposals 
because of the Russian-German oil pipeline, which has become a major irritant for Poland. Hence 
closer energy cooperation in the Black Sea Region, of which Germany is clearly supportive of,  
is not enthusiastically supported in Poland either. The Czech diplomacy that cooperates with both 
Poland and Germany on a number of issues tries not to take sides but in the long term it should be 
able to spell out its preferences. Although the Black Sea cooperation has a number  
of weaknesses, Czech diplomats are aware that it represents an important region for the transport 
of oil and gas from Central Asia. Because of this, the Czech Republic should support the Black 
Sea cooperation, which is one of the few examples of multilateral cooperation, in which several 
ENP partner countries cooperate on substantive issues.  
 
 
Enhanced cooperation with the Visegrád Countries 
 
 Cooperation with other Visegrád Countries lost much of its drive after the EU enlargement 
of 2004. Today the Eastern Policy seems a hopeful candidate for replacing enlargement-related 
matters as the main vehicle of these countries foreign policy cooperation.30 However, several 
issues put a question mark over the ability of the V4 to cooperate effectively in this area. First of all, 
all four countries are currently undergoing a highly tumultuous period in their domestic political 
arenas. As a result, their governments are hard pressed by the opposition and sometimes fall into 
extreme positions, which might be unacceptable for their V4 partners. Still, there have been 
attempts to find common ground; for instance, in 2001, the Swedish presidency invited the V4  
to consultations about one EU strategy regarding Ukraine. A newer and more broadly conceived 
example was the abovementioned non-paper on the ENP. Nevertheless, the V4 still encounter 
difficulties in coordinating their foreign policies towards the East and their positions in the ENP. As 
one Czech diplomat bluntly stated, “there are issues where it is possible to agree, but others where 
it is not the case”.31  
 
 As a result, the Czech Republic should aim at cooperation in those areas where there is  
a clearly stated consensus among the V4 about the approach to the East. For instance, Prague 
could assume a leading role in promoting further softening of the visa regime towards the eastern 
neighbours. Although the entry into the Schengen Area undoubtedly remains a Czech priority, this 
should not mean that other issues should be entirely sidelined; especially, if the coordinated 
approach of the four countries could bring some results (A failed chance for such an approach was 
the recent acquiescence of Czech diplomacy to increase the visa fee for entering the Schengen 
Area to 60 Euro).  
 
 As the current window of opportunity is closing, because the ENP priorities will shortly 
switch to the South with the Portuguese EU presidency, the Czech Republic should secure the 
agreement of the other V4 countries in as many areas as possible before its own EU presidency in 
2009. Indeed, after a row of countries with different foreign policy priorities (Portugal, Slovenia, and 
France), the Czech presidency will be the first to look to the East and so a substantial input  
to revitalise the ENP’s eastern dimension will be expected from Prague.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 For the potential contribution of the Czech diplomacy to the eastern reorientation of the V4 see Nekvapil, V., Berdych, A. a Veselý, L. 
(eds.) (2007), Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy 2007. Association for International Affairs, Prague. 
31 Interview with a Czech diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 7 February 2007. 
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More streamlining on the domestic front 
 
 However active the Czech Republic will be in the EU and vis-à-vis the other Visegrád 
Countries, the key prerequisite for a successful policy is a well-knit strategy toward the East, 
elaborated consensually on the domestic level. Although there are some signs that such a strategy 
is being born, a lot must still be done before it can have some impact on Czech foreign policy. 
First, individual policies towards Eastern Europe are not coordinated enough. To give just one 
example, the Czech focus on human rights is kept separate from the discussions on trade and 
investment policies. Thus, it is easy to criticise Belarus because its economic importance to the 
Czech Republic is negligible. However, criticism of Russia (be it Chechnya or the retreat from 
democracy) is always muted and allusive.  
 
 Second, institutional coordination of the policy is also extremely difficult. Although a number 
of central institutions deal with ENP partner countries, they seldom see their activities as part of the 
ENP. Consequently, the only institution really dealing with the ENP is the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; however, even there the communication has to overcome substantial problems.  
In particular, the existence of several departments dealing with the ENP (including a territorial 
department, a department dealing with EU external policies, a department for development aid and 
the abovementioned department for transition assistance) makes it very difficult to streamline the 
Ministry’s work.32  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Czech Eastern Policy has almost miraculously blossomed from an unloved and forgotten 
orphan into a handsome youth filled with energy. However, more is still needed for the policy  
to mature: Two key factors for improvement include the securing of better coordination at home, 
and attracting the interest of Czech politicians and the public. Only these steps will allow for further 
progress in the international arena. But even though Czech involvement in shaping the ENP came 
about quite late, the winds of change are blowing and Prague now tends to define its market niche 
in regard to the contents of its policy and its geographic focus. Yet, compared to other member 
states, Czech propositions remain rather timid thus far, and the ENP is still not visible enough  
in the government’s foreign policy. Only a steady course and clear focus, which respects the views 
of its partner countries, will allow Czech diplomacy to make the ENP a pillar for its EU presidency 
in 2009.  
 
 
 
 
* The opinions of the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung. 
                                                 
32 Cf. also Kratochvíl, P. (2007), Existuje česká východní politika? Od úprku z východní Evropy k opožděnému návratu (Does the Czech 
Eastern Policy exist? From the stampede from Eastern Europe to a belated return). Mezinárodní politika 4/2007. 
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